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Is it possible to draw lines in PAS laws that clearly distinguish the dying from those with disabilities? This chapter studies two such lines drawn by U.S. Death With Dignity Acts: the requirement that patients be ‘terminally ill,’ and the requirement that patients act autonomously. These PAS safeguards are studied against a background of charges made by disability activists that neither line can protect people with disabilities from inclusion in PAS practices. I argue that while the first line that divides the dying from those with disabilities can hold, the second line concerning autonomy provides little protection in an ableist society that equates disability with indignity. My conclusion, however, is that rather than trust lines to erect safeguards, legalized PAS needs to be embedded in a social structure that offers compassionate care, social supports, and a theory of disability that rejects marginalization. Only then are safeguards in place and patient choice genuine.
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